The university building in Gali
Photo: www.from-ua.com
On the background of the USSR collapse, the “Parade of Sovereignties” of the independent and not really formations begins: according to the results of the referendum of 1991, the Crimean Socialist Soviet Republic (that existed from 1921 till 1946) was reconstructed instead of the Crimean region, and the Abkhazian Autonomy that was a part of Georgia declared itself the Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic (the republic possessed this status from 1921 – 1931, forming part of the USSR through the Georgian SSR). Domination of the ideological principles over the legal standards and their total ignoration (remember the soviet justice of the Stalin era) and also once too often rewriting of constitutions planted a time bomb under the whole soviet system that exploded, when the central power became weak.
After the USSR collapse, on June 23, 1992 the Abkhazian parliament, infracting its own constitution, accepts the decision on sovereignty of the Abkhazian Republic without the qualified majority. A sharp political crisis continues in Georgia at that period. The timing was perfect.
In response to the local separatism, Georgia sends troops. It is the beginning of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict that took thousands of lives: according to the official data, 4 thousand Georgians (nearly one thousand went missing) and 4 thousand of Abkhazians have been killed. 250 thousand Georgians (almost half of the population of the republic) escaped from Abkhazia, fearing crackdown. Through the intermediary of Russia the war ended in signature of the Cease-fire Agreement and separation of forces in May 1994.
Why was the Abkhazian parliament on the edge of doing the provocative step? Why didn’t it choose the civilized way: conductive a referendum under the international control, by the virtue of which it would be possible to claim on quite legal state sovereign status? The answer is simple: there were only 95 thousand of the Abkhazians out of half a million of population of the republic. The referendum was conducted later when there were almost no Georgians left in the country.
On November 26, 1994 the Abkhazian Republic adopted the Constitution that declared its independence. Georgia and other member of the UNO, except four countries (Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Nauru) didn’t recognize its statehood. “Diplomatic” recognition by companions in misfortune like Transdniestria, Nagorny Karabakh and the “LNR” is barely possible to consider as success of the Abkhazian diplomacy.
The Russian’s part in the conflict
It seems from outside that Russia looked only as a mediator and a peacemaker: with its support the cease-fire agreements were signed. It acts as a guarantor of their fulfilment, suppressing aggression of the Abkhazians and their allies (tens of thousands militants from the republics of the North Caucasus had been taking part in that war). The Russian militaries that were located on the Soviet military bases in Abkhazia seemed to maintain neutrality… and shelled Georgian positions every once and again (solely in response to the actions of the Georgians). Of course, there was no Russian weapon in Abkhazia and Georgian passenger aircrafts were shot down by missiles, which had been bought in a defense ministry retail shop or on the market in Gagra. After the signature of the Agreement in 1994, peacemakers of the CIS – the Russian militaries that had been stationed right there on the military bases entered the territory of Abkhazia.
But the most essential part of the Russian Federation appeared a lot later. Approximately from the beginning of 2000s Russia gradually restores economical contacts and traffic connections with Abkhazia, despite the decision of the CIS summit that forbids all the contacts with the republic. At the same time, as usually, the Russian leadership referred to the development of contacts solely on the private level. The Russian authorities actively issue passports of the Russian Federation and pensions together with benefits to anybody, who wants them. Considering that economy of the region practically does not function, the number of the willing ones to become Russians reaches 90%.
In 2008 after the successful military warfare against Georgia because of South Ossetia, the Russian Federation recognizes the independence of both republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by “taking into consideration the free expression of will of the Ossetian and Abkhazian peoples” and referring to their right for the self-determination. And on November 24, 2014 Russia and Abkhazia signed the treaty of alliance and strategic partnership, according to which a common defensive space was established. At the same time, Russia plans to increase the financial support of Abkhazia up to RUR 5 billion per year.
Abkhazia and Crimea: a similar scenario – different result.
So, what unites and differs these two scenarios – the Abkhazian and Crimean one?
First of all: during formation of the USSR, both territories had a higher status, that the local elite wanted to restore, making use out of the weakness of the central and regional authorities. Abkhazia had the status very nearly to the Union Republic till 1931; Crimea had the status of the Autonomy till 1946. Abkhazia returned the status of the Union Republic in 1990 and Crimea returned the autonomous status after the referendum in 1991.
Secondly: the procedure of the independence declaration. On May 5, 1992 the parliament of Crimea adopted the “Act of Independence”, by means of which the Republic of Crimea was formed. The constitution of Crimea has been adopted the next day. Ukrainian politicians had to make a lot of efforts for cancelation of these documents in 1995.
The Abkhazian parliament makes the similar decision about independence on June 23, 1992. Due to certain related to the domestic policy reasons, Georgia chooses not the negotiation process but the military scenario that eventually brought to the inter-ethnic conflict and huge human casualties.
Thirdly: a part of the Russian militarist. In both cases the Russian army played a significant role, but if in Abkhazia the militarists would at least save appearance of neutrality, secretly helping the Abkhazians, then in Crimea everything was completely different.
Now let’s talk about the differences.
Firstly: the time frames. The Crimean scenario has been realized 20 years after the Abkhazian one, what made certain allowances into it. The Ukrainian statehood have already established, unlikely to the Georgian one of the 1990s, this is why Crimea could declare independence but would hardly keep it. Correspondently, Russia strived to resolve the issue as fast as possible in order not to let the Ukrainian authorities and the world community recovers consciousness: the seizure of the governmental buildings, airport and train station by the “unknown armed men” on February 26; on March 16 – conduction of the referendum regarding the status of the peninsula. Results of such “expression of will that was taking place with the “masked gunmen in unmarked uniforms” on the background, have been foredoomed.
Secondly: the national factor. In Abkhazia, the Russians staked on the Abkhazian minority (the Abkhazians consisted no more than 20% of population of the republic in the beginning of the 1990s.) in Crimea – on the Russian majority. It simplified the task for them a lot.
Thirdly: the status of the territory. Logic goes that Crimea should have join the ranks of the para-states, but just because it always had the “sacral meaning” for Russia, it became a subject of the Russian Federation together with Sevastopol. Although, this fact of the “good will” didn’t receive the international recognition, and all the civilized world keeps on considering Crimea as part of Ukraine, progressively limiting economic, traffic, visa and other possibilities for the Crimeans every day. In other words: the status is completely different but the problems are factually the same, as for the other para-states..
