White spot on an electorate map of Ukraine

Expected low attendance of Crimeans for the elections and a lack of Crimean candidates in party lists is a phenomenon that deserves a special attention. In XXI century the peninsula became the first part of our country where elections will not be held, before Crimea only Chernobyl was left without electorate and now it is unclear what to do with the new, this time electoral exclusion zone. In 1988 Crimeans made up 4% from all the electorate of Ukraine, 4,5% of single-mandate constituencies accounted for the peninsula and this proportion have been remaining more or less the same for another 15 years. However, if 10 “majority deputies” got under the dome of Verkhovna Rada that year, then Crimean party deputies were disappointed as only 4 persons got through (1,8%). This situation didn’t change a bit in 2002 when only 10 majority and 4 party deputies got through. 4 years later only parties participated in election race, so it was natural that even less deputies represented Crimea: according to the party lists, only seven persons were elected. Real breakthrough happened on the special elections of 2007 when 13 party deputies that is just a little bit less than the general amount of deputies from Crimea in period within 1998-2005 got through. Again in 2012 only 10 “majority deputies” reinforced with 4 party candidates represented Crimea in Rada – water finds its own level. Such disregard could be offending as Crimea was always noted for the loyalty towards ruling parties and for selfless mobilization in a difficult time. In all-Ukrainian scale Crimeans made up 6% of communist electorate (even more than residents of Donetsk) and over 7% of Regionnaires. Without Crimean voices in 2006 and 2012 Party of Regions would not meet the physiological 30% barrier and Victor Fedorovich would lose nearly a whole percent to Yulia Vladimirovna on the second round of voting in 2010. To make a long story short, if it were not for Crimea, the Party of Communists and Party of Regions would not become leaders of election campaigns and Yanukovich would not become a president. If some Kirovograd or Kherson region fell out of the election campaign of 2014, the electorate picture wouldn’t change a lot but the absence of Crimea is a guarantee of Eastern “pro-Russian” (and what is more, pro-Soviet) course defeat. Central Electoral Commission keeps dividing Crimea into 10 election divisions and enables migrants to vote on actual place of residence (to tell the truth, only for parties). But the next Verkhovna Rada will lack at least 12 deputies (10 from Crimea and 2 from Sevastopol) and no one can say how many party elects will not get through. Today among several thousands of candidates only 22 can be considered as Crimeans (according to their place of incorporation or main activity) but only 2 or 3 of them will pass to Rada. The peninsula and migrants won’t have deputies’ lobby. Therefore everyone will go his own way. Having gotten rid of his nostalgic tough electorate part, Kiev can count on stronger unanimity of society. Simferopol may count on the possibility not live in its sole discretion for another couple of years. The problem is that when these two have to treat again, they will not be able to find right words at once and the approaching elections will play a serious part in the disintegration of once-common language.